Abstract-The problem of providing privacy, in the private information retrieval (PIR) sense, to users requesting data from a distributed storage system (DSS), is considered. The DSS is coded by an (n, k, d) maximum distance separable code to store the data reliably on unreliable storage nodes. Some of these nodes can be spies which report to a third party, such as an oppressive regime, which data is being requested by the user. An information theoretic PIR scheme ensures that a user can satisfy its request while revealing no information on which data is being requested to the nodes. A user can trivially achieve PIR by downloading all the data in the DSS. However, this is not a feasible solution due to its high communication cost. We construct PIR schemes with low download communication cost. When there is b = 1 spy node in the DSS, in other words, no collusion between the nodes, we construct PIR schemes with download cost 1 1−R per unit of requested data (R = k/n is the code rate), achieving the information theoretic limit for linear schemes. The proposed schemes are universal since they depend on the code rate, but not on the generator matrix of the code. Also, if b ≤ n−δk nodes collude, with δ = n−b k , we construct linear PIR schemes with download cost b+δk δ .
I. INTRODUCTION
C ONSIDER the following scenario. A group of online peers (storage nodes) want to collaborate together to form a peer-to-peer (p2p) distributed storage system (DSS) to store and share files reliably, while ensuring information theoretic private information retrieval (PIR). The PIR [2] , [3] property allows a user (possibly one of the peers) to download a file while revealing no information about which file is being downloaded. We are mainly motivated by the following two applications: 1) A DSS that protects users from surveillance and monitoring, for instance from an oppressive regime. The people (peers) collectively contribute to storing the data Then, the proposed scheme achieves PIR since the query vector to each node is statistically independent of the file index f . However, if a node, say node 1, knows the query vector of another node, say node 3, it may be able to pin down which file the user wanted, by computing e f = q − u. However, we assume that a node does not have access to the queries coming to any other nodes, and PIR is indeed achieved here. This PIR scheme downloads 4 symbols to retrieve a file of size 2 symbols. We say that the communication price of privacy cPoP = 4/2 = 2 for this scheme, which does not depend on the number of files in the system.
A. Replication-Based PIR
PIR was first introduced in the seminal papers of Chor et al. [2] , [3] followed by a significant amount of research in this area [4] - [8] , [11] , [12] . The classical model considers a binary database of length m and a user that wishes to privately retrieve the value of a bit (a record) in it, while minimizing the total communication cost including the upload (query) and download phase. Chor et al. [3] showed that if there is one server storing the database, the user has to download the whole database in order to achieve information theoretic PIR. However, when the database is replicated on n non-colluding (non-cooperating) servers (nodes), they devised a PIR scheme with total, upload and download, communication cost of O((n 2 log n)m 1/n ) and O(m 1/3 ) for the special case of n = 2. In the past few years, there has been significant progress in developing PIR protocols with total communication cost that is subpolynomial in the size of the database [11] - [13] . Moreover, a connection between PIR and blind interference alignment was discussed in [14] . PIR in a computational sense was shown to be achievable with a single server (no replication) in [15] assuming the hardness of quadratic residuosity problem. PIR schemes on databases that are replicated but not perfectly synchronized were studied in [16] .
B. Coded PIR
The original model studied in PIR assumes that the entire data is replicated on each node. PIR on coded data was studied in the literature on Batch Codes [17] , where the data is coded to allow parallel processing leading to amortizing the PIR communication cost over multiple retrievals. Recently, the PIR problem in DSSs that use erasure codes was initiated in [9] , where it was shown that one extra bit of download is sufficient to achieve PIR assuming the number of servers n to be exponential in the number of files. Bounds on the information theoretic tradeoff between storage and download communication cost for coded DSSs, for arbitrary number of files m, were derived in [10] . The setting when nodes can be byzantine (malicious) was considered in [18] and robust PIR schemes were devised using locally decodable codes. Robust PIR was also studied in [19] and [20] . In [21] , methods for transforming a replication-based PIR scheme into a codedbased PIR scheme with the same communication cost, up to a multiplicative constant, were studied. PIR array codes with optimal rate were designed in [22] .
Following this work in [1] and [23] , the lowest achievable price of privacy for repetition code on n nodes having m files and b colluding nodes was found in [24] and [25] to be 1−(b/n) m 1−(b/n) and that of an (n, k)-code was found in [26] to be 1−(k/n) m 1−(k/n) . Also, schemes using GRS codes have been constructed in [27] , and they conjectured that the lowest achievable price of privacy is
. That conjecture was then disproved using a counter example in [28] . Moreover, in [29] , PIR on coded data such that arbitrary sets of servers collude is studied. In [30] , PIR schemes for any arbitrary code were discussed. Some work was also done on symmetric PIR, where the objective is to not only protect the privacy of the user, but also the privacy of the server, such that the user should not get information about files other than the one he wants [31] . Also, the capacity of byzantine PIR on replicated storage systems was found in [32] .
C. Contributions
Motivated by the two DSS applications mentioned earlier, we draw the following distinctions with the previous literature prior to this work on coded PIR [1] : (i) To the best of our knowledge, all the previous work on coded PIR, except for [10] , assumes that the code is used to encode together data from different files (records). However, the model here is different, since in DSS applications only data chunks belonging to the same file are encoded together (as done in Example 1); (ii) The work in [10] studies fundamental limits on the costs of coded PIR. Here, we provide explicit constructions of PIR schemes with efficient communication cost.
In comparison with the classical literature on replicationbased PIR, we make the following observations: (i) We focus only on the number of downloaded symbols in the communication cost of a PIR scheme. This is since the upload query matrices are dependent only on the number of files and not on the size of the file, and typically in DSSs, the size of a file is relatively larger than the total number of files.; (ii) Up to b nodes may collude and share their queries in the hope of determining the requested file.
In the model we study, we assume that the MDS code parameters (n, k, d) are given and depend on the desired reliability level for the data. Therefore, they are not design parameters that can be chosen to optimize the efficiency of the PIR scheme. However, the code itself may have to be designed jointly with the PIR scheme. A PIR scheme incurs many overheads on the DSS, including communication cost, computations [7] , and connectivity; user contacts n instead of k nodes, as seen in Example 1. However, we measure here the efficiency of a PIR scheme only by its total download communication cost, which we refer to as the communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) . A more formal definition of cPoP is given in Definition 3 after the model we use has been established. The PIR rate is the inverse of the cPoP, i.e. the data downloaded from the required file per downloaded symbol. The following questions naturally arise here: (1) What is the minimum achievable cPoP for given n, k and b? (2) How to efficiently construct codes and PIR schemes that achieve optimal cPoP? (3) Do the code and PIR scheme have to be designed jointly to achieve optimum cPoP? The last question addresses the problem of whether reliability and PIR could be addressed separately in a DSS. Moreover, it may have practical implications on whether data already existing in coded form needs to be re-encoded to achieve PIR with minimum cPoP.
In this paper, we make progress towards answering the last two questions and provide constructions of efficient PIR schemes for querying MDS coded data. Specifically, we make the following contributions: (i) For b = 1, i.e., no colluding nodes, we construct a linear PIR scheme with cPoP = 1 1−R (R = k/n is the code rate), thus achieving the lower bound on cPoP for linear schemes in [10] and [26] While the minimum cPoP in this regime is unknown, the constructed schemes have a cPoP that does not depend on m, the number of files in the system. An important property of the scheme for b = 1 is its universality. It depends only on n, k, and b, but not on the generator matrix of the code. Moreover, both of these schemes can be constructed for any given MDS code, i.e., it is not necessary to design the code jointly with the PIR scheme. This implies that b does not have to be a rigid system parameter. Each user can choose their own value of b to reflect its desired privacy level, at the expense of a higher cPoP. The DSS can serve all the users simultaneously storing the same encoded data, i.e., without having to store different encodings for different values of b. The construction in [27] is a generalized version of the earlier scheme presented here. In both schemes, the parity check matrix of the storage system should be known. The two schemes perform equally well, and are in fact identical, for the case of no-collusion (b = 1) and for the case of (n − k)-collusion (b = n − k). In the intermediate regime, the generalized scheme in [27] outperforms our scheme.
II. MODEL

A. Distributed Storage Systems
Consider a distributed storage system (DSS) formed of n storage nodes indexed from 1 to n. The DSS stores m files, X 1 , . . . , X m , of equal sizes. The DSS uses WLOG a systematic 1 (n, k, d) MDS code over G F(q) to store the data redundantly and achieve reliability against d − 1 node failures. We assume that each file, X i , i = 1, . . . , m, is divided into α stripes, and each stripe is divided into k blocks. We represent the file
. . , k, as an α × k matrix, with symbols from the finite field G F(q w ). We divide the file into stripes to have the number of parts of X i be divisible by the number of queries and by the number of retrieved symbols per query.
Define X to be the mα×k matrix denoting all the systematic data in the system, i.e.,
Each stripe of each file is encoded separately using the same systematic MDS code with a k × n generator matrix = [λ i j ] with elements in G F(q). Since the code is systematic, the square submatrix of formed of the first k columns is the identity matrix. The encoded data, X, is stored on the DSS as shown in Table I . We assume that the user knows this layout table, i.e., he/she knows the coding coefficients for each node. We denote by w l ∈ G F(q w ) mα , l = 1, · · · , n the column vector representing all the data on node l.
B. PIR
Suppose the user wants file X f , where f is chosen uniformly at random from the set [m] = {1, . . . , m}. To retrieve file X f , the user sends requests to the nodes, among which there are b colluding nodes. The user does not know which nodes are colluding, else, he/she would avoid them. The goal is to devise a PIR scheme that allows the user to decode X f , while revealing no information, in an information theoretic sense, about f to the nodes. The colluding nodes can analyze the different requests they receive from the user in order to identify the requested file. However, as explained in the introduction, a node has access to the requests coming to at most b−1 other nodes in the system. Under this setting, we are interested in linear PIR schemes.
Definition 1: A PIR scheme is linear over G F(q), and of dimension μ, if it consists of the following two stages.
Request stage: Based on which file the user wants, he/she sends requests to a subset of nodes in the DSS. The request to node l takes the form of a μ × mα query matrix Q l over G F(q).
2. Download stage: Node l responds by sending the projection of its data onto Q l , i.e.,
We think of each query matrix Q l as formed of μ subqueries corresponding to each of its μ rows. Moreover, we think of the response of node l as formed of μ subresponses corresponding to projecting the node data on each row of Q l .
Definition 2 (Information theoretic PIR): A PIR scheme achieves (perfect) information theoretic PIR iff H
The objective is to design a linear PIR scheme that (i) allows the user to decode its requested file X f and (ii) achieves information theoretic PIR with a low cPoP that does not depend on m. In the classical literature on PIR, the communication cost includes both the number of bits exchanged during the request and download stages. However, the query vectors depend only on the number of files in the system, while the response vectors depend on the size of the files, i.e. for a single sub-query, the query vector to a node consists of m symbols in G F(q) while the response vector from one node is 1 symbol in G F(q w ). In DSSs, and in the information-theoretic reformulation of this problem, the size of the files are assumed to be arbitrarily large, thus making the number of the files negligible with respect to the size of the files [10] , i.e., w is much larger than m. Therefore, the download cost dominates the total communication cost.
Hence, we will only consider the download communication cost, which we will refer to as the communication price of privacy (cPoP).
Definition 3: [cPoP] The communication Price of Privacy (cPoP) of a PIR scheme is the ratio of the total number of bits sent from the nodes to the user during the download stage to size of the requested file. This is the inverse of the PIR rate
given in the literature.
Number of colluding nodes m Number of files μ Dimension of the scheme, number of rounds / subqueries / rows in query matrix r
Remainder of the division of n − k by k β Quotient of the division of n − k by k α Number of subdivisions u Random vector of size m w l Data on node l e f Indicator vector, the all-zero vector with one 1 in position f q l,i Query vector to Node l in sub-query i r l,i Response vector from Node l in sub-query i
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our two main results. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section IV-B, the proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section V-B, and the proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section VI.
Theorem 1: Consider a DSS using an (n, k) MDS code over G F(q), with b = 1, i.e. no collusion between the nodes. Then, the linear PIR scheme over G F(q) described in Section IV-A achieves perfect PIR with c Po
The existence of PIR schemes over large fields that can achieve cPoP = 1 1−R for b = 1 follows from Theorem 4 in [10] . The scheme in Section IV-A achieves the optimal cPoP given in [26] as m → ∞. We prove Theorem 1 by providing an explicit construction of the linear PIR scheme. The proposed PIR construction is over same field over which the code is designed and is universal in the sense that it depends only on the parameters n, k and b and not on the generator matrix of the code.
Theorem 2: Consider a DSS using an (n, k) MDS code over G F(q), with b colluding nodes
, 2 ≤ b ≤ d − 1. Then,
there exists an explicit linear PIR scheme over the same field that achieves perfect PIR with c Po
The next result is a generalization of Theorem 2 in which we describe a PIR scheme when b ≤ n − δk, for any δ ≥ 1. Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 3 when δ = 1, but we keep it for a better presentation of the proof. The optimal cPoP for PIR on coded data with colluding nodes is still an open problem. To illustrate the performance stated in the above three theorems, the price of privacy versus the rate of the storage code (R = k n ) when using the scheme of Theorem 1, the scheme of Theorem 2, and the scheme for Theorem 3 for n = 16 and b = 1 is shown in Figure 2 . We notice that Theorem 1 shows much improvement on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 for b = 1. We can also see that Theorem 3 improves on Theorem 2 when δ > 1.
IV. PIR SCHEME CONSTRUCTION AND PROOF FOR b = 1
A. PIR Scheme Construction for b = 1
We describe here the PIR scheme referred to in Theorem 1. We assume WLOG that the MDS code is systematic. The PIR scheme uses the number of stripes α = d−1 and the dimension μ = k. 2 We write α = βk + r where, β and r are integers and 0 ≤ r < k and β ≥ 0. 2 The parameters can be optimized to α =
, as was done in Example 1. But to simplify notation, we will take α = d − 1 and μ = k.
The scheme consists of the user sending a μ × mα query matrix Q l to each node l, l = 1, . . . , n. To form the query matrices, the user generates a μ × mα random matrix U = [u i j ], whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from G F(q), the same field over which the MDS code is defined. The query matrices have the following structure:
U is the random component of the query aimed at confusing the nodes about the request, whereas E f,l is a deterministic matrix that depends on the index f of the requested file.
The matrices E f,l add parts of the file X f that is being retrieved to the responses of the nodes. The user can download n − k symbols privately per sub-query, so the matrices E f,l add a symbol to the responses of n − k of the nodes per sub-query. In this scheme, the user retrieves r symbols from the systematic nodes, and βk symbols from the parity nodes.
Moreover, the retrieved symbols should not be redundant. The matrices E f,l are 0-1 matrices of dimensions μ × mα, every row corresponds to a sub-query and every column corresponds to a stripe of a file. A "1" in the (i, j ) th position of E f,l implies that, during the i th sub-query, the j th symbol on node l is being retrieved privately. The matrices E f,l are designed such that the following conditions hold: 1) Each row and column of the matrices E f,l contains at most one 1. The restriction on rows guarantees that we receive one coded symbol from a node, instead of the sum of several symbols. The column condition ensures that every symbol is only retrieved once, and thus, no retrieved symbol is redundant. 2) In each sub-query a 1 is added to the queries of exactly n − k nodes, i.e., for n − k of the matrices E f,l the i th row contains a 1. This allows the user to decode a codeword from the MDS storage code, since k symbols are not altered, and subsequently decode n − k symbols of the file X f . 3) If j is the index of a stripe of the requested file f then exactly k of the matrices E f,l contain a 1 in column j . This ensures that we retrieve exactly k MDS coded symbols per row, which are needed to recover the original stripe. Based on these desired retrieval patterns, we choose
and E f,l , l = 2, . . . , k, is obtained from matrix E f,l−1 by a single downward cyclic shift of its row vectors. We divide the first βk parity nodes into β groups of k nodes each. All nodes in group s, i.e., nodes l where sk + 1 ≤ l ≤ sk + k, receive the same query matrix, such that
For the remaining r parity nodes we let
and they hence all receive the same matrix U as a query. Proof: 1) E f,l has at most one 1 in each row and column. 2) For the matrices E f,l sent to the parity nodes, all βk of them contain exactly one 1 in row i . Since the k matrices E f,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ k sent to the systematic nodes are generated by cyclic row shifts of the matrix in (5), and it contains exactly r rows with a single 1, we see that r of these matrices contain a 1 in the i th row. In total we have βk + r = n − k matrices E f,l that contain a 1 in their i th row.
3) The columns corresponding to the stripes of file f are in the range Therefore, we get β = 1 and r = 
where 
B. Proof of Theorem 1
The following remarks from coding theory will be used on several occasions. For more background and proofs we refer to [33] .
Remark 1: A linear [n, k] code C is the set of all vectors
C := {x G : x ∈ F k q } ⊆ F n q ,
where G is a generator matrix of the code. Therefore C is a k dimensional subvectorspace of F n q and any linear combination of codewords in C is again a codeword in C.
Remark 2: The following statements are equivalent.
1) A [n, k] code C is MDS 2) For any generator matrix G C of C any k subset of columns is full rank.
3) The code C can recover from up to n − k erasures in any coordinates. We prove Theorem 1 by showing that the scheme described in Section IV-A has the following properties.
1) Decodability: For any sub-query i , we sort the nodes into two groups to prove decodability. By the properties of the E f,l in Claim 1 exactly k nodes receive only the vector u T i , the i th row of U , as a query. And the user is aware of the indices of these nodes. For these nodes l, the received symbols are given by
Since every stored stripe is a codeword in C, by Remark 1, any linear combination of stripes will be a codeword too. We notice that r li is indeed the l th component of the codeword r i = u T i · (w 1 , . . . , w n ). Since we have k of its components, we can recover the whole vector r i by Remark 2.
For the other nodes , the i th sub-query is of the form u T i + e g where e g is a standard basis vector, i.e., a single 1 has been added to the vector u i in position g. The received symbol r i = u T i · w + e g · w = u T i · w + w (g) therefore is the sum of the th component of r i and the g th symbol of w . Since we have recovered r i from the k unaltered components, we can retrieve w (g). Furthermore, the matrices E f,l are designed such that we retrieve exactly k symbols from every coded stripe of the f th file. Using Remark 2 again allows us to retrieve all stripes of file X f from these k symbols.
2) Privacy: Since b = 1, the only way a node l can learn information about f is from its own query matrix Q i . By, construction Q i is statistically independent of f and this scheme achieves perfect privacy.
3) cPoP: Every node l ∈ [n] responds with μ = k symbols. Therefore, the total number of symbols downloaded by the user is kn. Therefore, cPoP = In this section, we will describe the general PIR scheme that achieves cP O P = b + k by specifying the query matrices to each node. This scheme requires b ≤ d − 1. To simplify the description of the scheme, we will assume b = d − 1. 3 The scheme has dimension μ = k, i.e., it consists of μ = k subqueries. Moreover, the scheme requires no subdivisions, i.e., the number of stripes α = 1. Since there are no subdivisions, we simplify further the notation and write x j i1 = x j i to denote the i th systematic symbol of file X j , where j = 1, . . . , m. Denote by f the index of the file that the user wants, i.e., the user wants to retrieve file X f . WLOG, we assume the MDS code is systematic.
In the i th sub-query, i = 1, . . . , k, the proposed PIR scheme retrieves systematic symbol x f i of the wanted file X f . So, by the completion of the scheme, the user will have all the k symbols forming the file. In sub-query i , the user creates d − 1 random (column) vectors u 1,i , . . . , u d−1,i , of dimension m each, whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from G F(q). Recall that the generator matrix for any systematic (n, k, d) MDS code is of the form
where P is a k × d − 1 matrix describing the parity nodes. A parity check matrix for this code is then given by
Define Note that each row of U i H is a codeword in the dual of the MDS code used to store the data. For i = 1, . . . , k, let q l,i be the i th sub-query vector to node l with l = 1, . . . , n. These query vectors are chosen as follows:
where e f is the standard basis vector with a single 1 in position f . Therefore, the response of node l to the i th sub-query, denoted by r l,i , is given by (2) and can be written as
where w l is the vector representing the data stored on node l. We will give an example. 
The sub-query vectors to nodes 1 to 5 are the following respectively
Next, we want to show that the user can decode its requested file correctly. The nodes send back the length 3 vectors, r l = (r l,1 , r l,2 , r l,3 ) , l = 1, . . . , 5, to the user. Consider the first symbol in each of the vectors r l,1 , which form the following linear system:
where I l j = u T j,1 w l , for l = 1, 2, 3 denoting the node index, and j = 1, 2 denoting the random vector. In analogy with the interference alignment literature [34] , [35] (20) to (24) , we get a 1 . This PIR scheme downloads 3 packets from each server. Therefore, it has a c Po P = 
The sub-query vectors to nodes 1 to 4 are the following respectively
The nodes will respond to the user by projecting their data on the query matrices. With inspection of the queries, we can see that the user will be able to decode a f from the first subquery, and similarly decode b f from the second sub-query. This achieves a c Po P = 4.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 by showing that the scheme described in Section V-A ensures decodability and privacy. The main ingredient in the proof, which makes it different from the proof of Theorem 1, is that the scheme does not require the user to decode all the interference terms. Recall that the user wants to retrieve file X f . We will prove that the user can retrieve x f i in the i th sub-query. An alternative proof of Theorem 2 is shown in the Appendix.
1) Decodability:
The response of node l = 1, . . . , n to the i th sub-query is given by
To decode x f i , the user sums the responses of all the nodes to the i th sub-query, i.e., it computes n l=1 r l,i . Claim 2:
where tr(·) is the trace operator. Equation (30) follows directly from the scheme, equation (31) follows from the fact that tr(A T B) = tr(AB T ), and equation (32) 
Where the equality in equation (36) k . We can see that for δ = 1, this simplifies to Theorem 2. Figure 3 shows a comparison of the construction of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Example 6: Consider again the (6, 2, 5) MDS code in table V and b = 2. We notice that in example 5, we did not use nodes 5 and 6, and achieved c Po P = 4. Now we will show how we can use those nodes and achieve a lower c Po P = 3. Assume the user wants file X f .
We first choose the last b = 2 of the parity nodes to be common nodes. Then, we split the rest of the δk = 4 nodes into δ = 2 groups of k = 2 nodes each. We then consider the 
The parity check matrices of the (4, 2, 3) MDS codes generated by G 1 , and G 2 are
In this example, we will not subdivide the files into stripes, and one sub-query is required in which we will decode both parts of the file. 
The query vectors to nodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 are chosen as follows:
The query vectors to nodes 5, 6 are 
This is a dual of the code generated by the matrix
G = B 1 0 P 0 B 2 P .
A. General Proof of Theorem 3
We assume the user wants file X f . Assume n = b + δk. 4 The user uses the last b nodes, n δk+1 , . . . , n δk+b as common nodes. The rest of the nodes will be divided into δ groups, j = 1, . . . , δ, of k nodes each. This forms δ punctured (b + k, k) MDS codes, each with a generator matrix B j P b×b which can be transformed to systematic form G j = I k×k P j by multiplying by the inverse of the k × k matrix B j . Here we will use α = δ subdivisions and k queries. 5 We calculate the parity check matrix of the δ codes. , as was done in Example 6. But to simplify notation, we will take α = δ and μ = k.
For the nodes l = 1, . . . , δk, the query vectors in sub-query i are as follows:
For the nodes l = δk + 1, . . . , δk + b, the query vectors in sub-query i are the columns of U i
B. Decodability
For each subcode j , we follow the scheme of Theorem 2 to obtain the j th stripe of file x f . Subsequently, the user is able to decode the file x f .
C. Privacy
The queries are generating by multiplying the random matrix U on the matrix
This is a dual of the code generated by the matrix
We see that the code generated by G is an (δk + b, δk, b + 1) MDS code, and thus the queries are sent using an (δk + b, b, δk + 1) MDS code.
This means that any b queries are linearly independent and thus this is private against b colluding nodes.
The user contacts b + δk nodes, to download δ information parts, thus the price of privacy of this is cPoP = b+δk δ .
VII. COMPARISON TO FUNDAMENTAL BOUNDS
Our scheme achieves the fundamental bounds currently known for infinite number of files and 1 spy node, i.e. no collusion. The lowest achievable price of privacy of a storage system with replicated databases is given in [25] 
VIII. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of constructing PIR schemes with low communication cost for requesting data from a DSS that uses MDS codes. Some nodes in the DSS may be spies who will report to a third party, such as an oppressive regime, which data is being requested by a user. The objective is to allow the user to obtain its requested data without revealing any information on the identity of the data to the nodes. We constructed PIR schemes against non-colluding nodes that achieve the information theoretic limit on the download communication cost for linear schemes. An important property of these schemes is their universality since they depend on the code rate, but not on the MDS code itself. When there is bcollusion with 2 ≤ b ≤ n − k, we devised linear PIR schemes that have download cost equal to b + k per unit of requested data.
APPENDIX
Alternative Proof of Theorem 2
To simplify the description of the scheme, we will assume b = n − k. The scheme has dimension μ = k, i.e., it consists of μ = k sub-queries. Moreover, the scheme requires no subdivisions, i.e., the number of stripes α = 1. Since there are no subdivisions, we simplify further the notation and write x j i1 = x j i to denote the i th systematic symbol of file X j , where j = 1, . . . , m. Denote by f the index of the file that the user wants, i.e., the user wants to retrieve file X f .
In the i th sub-query, i = 1, . . . , k, the proposed PIR scheme retrieves systematic symbol x f i of the wanted file X f . So, by the completion of the scheme, the user will have obtained all the k symbols forming the file.
In sub-query i , the user creates b random (column) vectors u 1,i , . . . , u b,i , of dimension m each, whose elements are chosen uniformly at random from G F(q). Define U i to be the m × d − 1 matrix with its rows being the b = n − k random vectors used in sub-query i , i.e., 
